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way beyond the tautological human hoards to the earth, to the animals 
who are after all more subtle, less befuddled by epistemology, more worldly, 
more optimistic. 
I think of the Parisian composer Messiaen's musical transcriptions of 
bird calls of the 1950s and 1960s. "No one gets to hear them in the city," 
he explained in an interview. I imagine him throwing them pieces of bread. 
"There is some for you too. What do you have to tell us?" The world be- 
comes good just hearing such a story. I hesitate to add that Messiaen ear- 
lier wrote his Quartet for the End of Time (Quatuor pour la fin du temps) 
while interned in a Nazi camp, a piece which is today much more famous 
than the bird transcriptions. I imagine him listening to the birds in the 
camp; I imagine them helping him to compose-singing, coming and going, 
keeping the way open. 
-Lang Baker 
Patagonia 
Name of uncertain origin. Pata = foot (?), Gonia (? ) .  The "ultimate ulti- 
mate" according to Bruce Chatwin who literally wrote the book In Patag- 
onia about the vast, featureless lands of southern Argentina. 
Early explorers called Patagonia a land of fierce giants and monsters. 
Later Charles Darwin called the inhabitants-the all-too human Fuegian 
Indians- "wretched" creatures. Paleontologists noted that the monsters 
were merely oversized sloths. 
Legends of rivers of diamonds and rubies lured opportunistic Spanish 
and English privateers to a land that instead yielded wind and dust. Stories 
of a lost City of Caesars (inhabited by a race of robust Aryans and burst- 
ing with gold) nestled deep in the heart of the Patagonian Andes kept fleets 
of intrepid Jesuit missionaries busy as they plunged deeper and deeper into 
the heart of the Patagonian wilderness in search of Christian souls in need 
of salvation. 
Later, homesick Welsh settlers (marooned in Patagonia after buying 
one-way tickets to what they thought was a New World paradise) estab- 
lished tidy farmsteads and proper tea rooms overlooking the barren pam- 
pas. The American cowboy Butch Cassidy was rumored to  have made 
Patagonia his hideout (the Hollywood movie version of his life and death 
later changed the location to Bolivia). 
Patagonia's modern day cachet is exemplified by the eponymous, multi- 
million dollar company whose expensive outdoor clothing and designer 
catalogues are found in shopping malls around the globe. Armies of eco- 
tourists (socially responsible masses clad in neon-colored Patagonia brand 
parkas) descend upon Patagonia (the land) to shoot (with cameras, of 
course) the seals, penguins and birds for whom Patagonia is only a name- 
less place to eat and shit. 
The transformation of Patagonia from a terra incognita to a consumer 
product and global brand name is a logical one as humankind passes from 
the Golden Age of Exploration to the tarnished millennium of commodi- 
fication and merchandising that extend to the outer reaches of the map. 
-Jill Yesko 
Peace 
".. .AND N O  KIND OF  
peace. 
Grey nights, foreknown to be cool. 
Stimulus dollops, otter-like, 
over consciousness gravel 
on their way to 
little memory bubbles. 
Grey-within-grey of substance. 
A half-pain, a second one, with no 
lasting trace, half-way 
here. A half-desire. 
Things in motion, things occupied. 
Cameo 
of compulsive repetition." 
(Paul Celan} 
-Paul Kelley 
Excerpted from "...and no kind of," (1968), The Poems of Paul Celan, trans. Michael 
Hamburger (New York: Persea Books, 1988), 281. 
People 
Every interpretation of the political meaning of the termi "people" must 
begin from the singular fact that, in modern European languages, it always 
indicates even the poor, the disinherited, the excluded. One single term 
names, that is, as much the constitutive political subject as the class which, 
de facto if not de jure, is excluded from politics. 
The Italian popolo, the French peuple, the Spanish pueblo (like the cor- 
responding adjectives popolare, populaire, popular and the late Latin pop- 
ulus and popularis from which they all derive), designate both in everyday 
language and in the lexicon of political language, the ensemble of citizens 
as a unitary political body (as in "Italian people" or in "member of the 
jury") or those who belong to the lower classes (as in homme du peuple, 
rione popolare, front populaire). Although it has a more undifferentiated 
sense, even the English term "people" conserves, nevertheless, the mean- 
ing of "ordinary people"2 in opposition to the rich and the nobility. In the 
American Constitution one reads, without distinctions of any kind, "We 
the people of the United States.. ."; but when Lincoln, in the Gettysburg 
Address, invokes a "Government of the people, by the people, for the 
people," the repetition implicitly contrasts one people with another. The 
extent to which this ambiguity was essential even during the French 
Revolution (that is, precisely at  the moment in which the principle of 
a popular sovereignty is demanded) is evidenced by the role played by 
the compassion for the people understood as the excluded class. Hannah 
Arendt has recalled that "the very definition of the word was born out of 
compassion, and the term became the equivalent for misfortune and un- 
happiness-le peuple, les malhereux m'applaudissent, as Robespierre was 
wont to say; Le peuple toujours malhereux, as even Siey;s, one of the least 
sentimental and most sober figures of the Revolution, would put it."3 But 
already with Bodin, by contrast, during the chapter of the Re'publique 
when Democracy or the  tat Populaire becomes defined, the concept has 
a double meaning: peuple en corps, as the appointed of sovereignty, is 
compared to the menu peuple4 which wisdom counsels to exclude from 
political power. 
Such a constant and widespread semantic ambiguity cannot be acciden- 
tal; it must reflect a discursive equivocation inherent in the nature and in 
the function of the concept "people" in occidental politics. Everything 
occurs as if that which we call "people" was, in reality, not a unitary sub- 
ject, but a dialectical oscillation between two opposed poles: on the one 
hand, the whole People as an integral political body, on the other hand, 
the "part-people" as a fragmentary multiplicity of needful and excluded 
bodies; one as an inclusion which presumes itself to be without remain- 
ders, another that ltnows itself as being without hope; at  one extreme, the 
total state of integrated and sovereign citizens, on the other, the outlawed 
court of miracless or the group of the miserable, the oppressed, the van- 
quished. A unique and solid referent of the term "people" does not exist, 
in this sense, anywhere: like many fundamental political concepts (similar, 
in this, to the Urworte of Abel or Freud or to the hierarchical relations of 
Dumont), "people" is a polar concept which indicates a double movement 
and a complex relation between two extremes. But this also means that the 
constitution of the human species in a body politic moves across a funda- 
mental split and that, in the concept "people," we can recognize without 
difficulty the categorical pairs which define an original political structure: 
naked life (people) and political existence (People), exclusion and inclu- 
sion, zoe and bios. The "people" always carries within itself a fundamen- 
tal biopolitical fracture. It is that which cannot be included in the totality 
of which it is a part and cannot belong to the whole in which it is already 
included. 
From here arise the contradictions and the aporias which it fosters each 
time it is evoked and put in play on the political scene. It is that which is 
always already and that must, nevertheless, realize itself; it is the pure 
source of any identity and must, however, redefine and purify itself con- 
tinuously through exclusion, language, blood, territory. In other words, 
taken from its opposite pole, "the people" is that which is essentially 
lacking in itself and whose fulfillment coincides, nevertheless, with its 
own abolition; it is that which, in order to be, must negate itself with its 
opposite (from here begins the specific aporias of the workers' movement, 
turned towards the people, and together, tending towards its abolition). 
From time to time, as the bloody standard of the reaction and the uncer- 
tain lesson of the revolutions and of popular fronts, "the people" has, in 
any case, a more originary split than the one between friend and enemy; 
an incessant civil war divides it more radically than any conflict and, 
together, keeps it unified and constitutes more firmly than any identity. 
To look closely, then, at that which Marx calls the class struggle and that, 
although remaining substantially undefined, occupies a place so central in 
his thought, is none other than this internecine war that divides every 
people and that will have an end only when, in the classless society or in 
the Messianic kingdom, People and people will coincide and there will no 
longer properly be a "people" as such. 
If this is true, if "the people" necessarily contains at its core a funda- 
mental biopolitical fracture, it will then be possible to read, in a new way, 
a few decisive pages of the history of our century. While it is true that the 
struggle between the two "people" was certainly always on the way, in our 
time it has suffered a last, paroxistic acceleration. In Ancient Rome, the 
internal split of the people was juridically sanctioned in the clear division 
between populus and plebs; each had their own institutions and magis- 
trates, just as in the Medieval Age the distinction between the hungry and 
the well-fed6 corresponded to a precise division of different crafts and 
trades; but when, beginning with the French Revolution, "the people" 
becomes the unique testimony of sovereignty, it transforms itself into an 
embarrassing presence, and misery and exclusion appear for the first time, 
in every sense, as an intolerable scandal. In the modern age, misery and 
exclusion are not only economic or social concepts, but are eminently 
political categories (every economicism and the "socialism" which seem to 
dominate modern politics have, in reality, a political, or better yet, a bio- 
political meaning). 
From this perspective, our epoch is nothing other than the attempt- 
implacable and methodical-to end the split which divides the people, 
thus radically eliminating the population of the excluded. This attempt 
joins, according to different formalities and horizons, the right and the 
left, capitalist countries and socialist countries, all of which are united in 
the project-futile in the final analysis but which has been partially real- 
ized in all industrialized countries-of producing a one, indivisible people; 
the obsession with development is so successful in our time because it 
coincides with the biopolitical project of producing a people without a 
fracture. 
The extermination of the Jews in Nazi Germany acquires, in this light, 
a radically new meaning. Insofar as they are a people which refuses to inte- 
grate itself in a national political body (one presupposes, in fact, that each 
of its assimilations is, in reality, only simulated), the Jews are the repre- 
sentatives par excellence and almost the living symbol of "the people," of 
that naked life which modernity necessarily creates at its core but whose 
presence it can no longer in any way tolerate. And in the clear fury with 
which the German Volk, representative par excellence of "the people" as 
a political body, seeks to eliminate the Jews, we must witness the extreme 
phase of the internecine war which divides People and people. With the 
Final Solution (which involves, not accidentally, also gypsies and other 
o ~ t s i d e r s ) ~  Nazism seeks obscurely and uselessly to liberate the Western 
political scene from this intolerable shadow in order to finally produce the 
German Volk as a people which has ended the original biopolitical frac- 
ture (for this reason the Nazi leaders repeat so obstinately that, by elimi- 
nating Jews and gypsies, they are, in reality, also working on behalf of the 
other European peoples.) 
To paraphrase the Freudian postulate on the relation between Es and 
Ich, one could say that modern biopolitics is established from the sec- 
ondary principle of "where naked life is, a People will have to be"* on the 
condition, however, of immediately adding that this principle is valid even 
in its inverted formulation: "where a People is, there shall naked life be." 
The fracture that was thought to have been repaired by eliminating the 
people (the Jews which are its symbol), reproduces itself such that the 
entire German people is transformed anew in a sacred life dedicated to 
death and in a biological body which must be infinitely purified (elimi- 
nating the mentally ill and the carriers of hereditary diseases). And in a 
different but analogical way, today the capitalist-democratic project of 
eliminating, through development, the poor classes, not only reproduces at 
its own core the population of the excluded, but transforms into naked life 
all the populations of the Third World. Only a politics that has known 
how to settle accounts with the fundamental biopolitical split of the occi- 
dent will be able to arrest this oscillation and put an end to the civil war 
which divides the peoples and the cities of the world. 
Translator's Notes 
[This essay appears in Agamben's Moyen sans fins: Notes sur la Politique (Paris: Rivages, 
1995).] 
1 Throughout the essay, Giorgio Agamben has sometimes chosen words whose semantic 
richness are themselves indicative of the subject of his thought. For example, the word I 
have rendered as "term" is, in Italian, termine. The most apparent double-meaning of ter- 
mine is "term" (as in a linguistic referent) and "end," "limit," "boundary." 
2 In English in the original. 
3 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1963). 
4 In French, perrple en corps means the people who are important, who matter, who 
have "substance"; menu peuple, on the other hand, means the people who are unimpor- 
tant, inconsequential, trifling. Agamben is also emphasizing the difference (as he will at 
a later point in the essay when discussing a distinction in the Middle Ages between 
popolo minuto, literally, small or thin people, and popolo grasso, literally, fat people) by 
indicating how the peuple en corps are the well-fed as opposed to the menu peuple as 
the hungry. 
5 La bandita corte dei miracoli cannot be properly translated. By putting bandita and 
corte together, Agamben has revealed the impossible position occupied by the peasant 
during the Middle Ages. A bandita is an area of land where, by public decree or proclama- 
tion (bando) it is illegal to hunt, fish, or put animals out to pasture. The corte, similar to 
the English "court," is the residency of a sovereign, i.e., a lord, as well as the territory 
surrounding the feudal castle. The Medieval peasant, therefore, belonged nowhere, for he 
was a1 bando, exiled and excluded; they had no  place either outside or inside the castle. 
They were, even without committing any acts, deemed criminal, a bandito, an outlaw. 
6 I have translated popolo rninuto and popolo grasso as the hungry and the well-fed in 
order to correspond with the earlier note on peuple en corps and menu petcple. See 
endnote number 4. 
7 The word I have translated as "outsiders" is, in Agamben's essay, inintegrabrli. This 
implies, at the same time, being unable to be "integrated," the inability to be "integral," 
(complete or whole) and even perhaps, by consequence, that which has no integrity. 
8 Freud's postulate is found at the end of Lecture 31 of the New Introductory Lectures 
on Psychoanalysis. In the Strachey translation from the The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, (Vol. 22) it reads: "where id was, 
there ego shall be." The German, still the subject of debate, reads: "WO Es wav, sol1 
Ich werden." My translation of Agamben's rendering has retained the slight change from 
the first (un Pop010 dour2 essere) to the second (12 vi sar2 nuda vita). In the first, the 
emphasis is on the imperative dovrri (will have to); in the second, the emphasis is on sarri 
(will be). 
-Giorgio Agamben 




"This is what the film diva looks like. She is twenty-four years old, fea- 
tured on the cover of an illustrated magazine, standing in front of the 
Hotel Excelsior on the Lido. The date is September. If one were to look 
through a magnifying glass one could make out the grain, the millions of 
little dots that constitute the diva, the waves and the hotel. The picture, 
however, refers not to the dot matrix but to the living diva on the Lido. 
Time: present. The caption calls her demonic: our demonic diva. Still, she 
does not lack a certain allure. The bangs, the seductive position of the 
head, and the twelve eyelashes right and left-all these details diligently 
recorded by the camera, are in their proper place, a flawless appearance. 
Everyone recognizes her with delight, since everyone has already seen the 
original on the screen. It is such a good likeness that she cannot be con- 
fused with anyone else, even if she is perhaps only one-twelfth of a dozen 
Tiller Girls. Dreamily she stands in front of the Hotel Excelsior, which 
basks in her fame-a being of flesh and blood, our demonic diva, twenty- 
four years old, on the Lido. The date is September." (Sigfried Kracauer} 
-Susan Lord 
Excerpted from "Photography," (1927) The Mass Ornament: Wezmar Essays, trans., ed., 
and Intro., Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1995), 47 
Planetarium 
"If one had to expound the doctrine of antiquity with utmost brevity while 
standing on one leg, as did Hillel that of the Jews, it could only be in this 
sentence: 'They alone shall possess the earth who live from the powers of 
the cosmos.' Nothing distinguishes the ancient from the modern man so 
much as the former's absorption in a cosmic experience scarcely known to 
later periods. Its wanting is marked by the flowering of astronomy at the 
beginning of the modern age. Kepler, Copernicus, and Tycho Brahe were 
certainly not driven by scientific impulses alone. All the same, the exclusive 





very quickly led, contained a portent of what was to come. The ancients' 
intercourse with the cosmos had been different: the ecstatic trance. For it is 
in this experience alone that we gain certain knowledge of what is nearest 
to us and what is remotest to us, and never of one without the other. This 
means, however, that man can be in ecstatic contact with the cosmos only 
communally. It is the dangerous error of modern men to regard this expe- 
rience as unimportant and avoidable, and to consign it to the individual as 
the poetic rapture of starry nights. It is not; its hour strikes again and again, 
and then neither nations nor generations can escape it, as was made terri- 
bly clear by the last war, which was an attempt at new and unprecedented 
comingling with the cosmic powers. Human multitudes, gases, electrical 
forces were hurled into the open country, high-frequency currents coursed 
through the landscape, new constellations rose in the sky, aerial space 
and ocean depths thundered with propellers, and everywhere sacrificial 
shafts were dug in Mother Earth. The immense wooing of the cosmos was 
enacted for the first time on a planetary scale, that is, in the spirit of tech- 
nology. But because the lust for profit of the ruling class sought satisfac- 
tion through it, technology betrayed man and turned the bridal bed into a 
bloodbath. The mastery of nature, so the imperialists teach, is the purpose 
of all technology. But who would trust a cane wielder who proclaimed 
the mastery of children by adults to be the purpose of education? Is not 
education above all the indispensable ordering of the relationship between 
generations and therefore mastery, if we are to use this term, of that rela- 
tionship and not of children? And likewise technology is not the mastery of 
nature but of the relation between nature and man. Men as species com- 
pleted their development thousands of years ago; but mankind as a species 
is just beginning his. In technology a physis is being organized through 
which mankind's contact with the cosmos takes a new and different form 
from that which it had in nations and families. One need recall only the 
experience of velocities by virtue of which mankind is now preparing to 
embark on incalculable journeys into the interior of time, to encounter 
there rhythms from which the sick shall draw strength as they did earlier 
on high mountains or at Southern Seas. The 'Lunaparks' are a prefigura- 
tion of sanatoria. The paroxysm of genuine cosmic experience is not tied 
to that tiny fragment of nature that we are accustomed to call 'Nature'. In 
the nights of annihilation of the last war the frame of mankind was shaken 
by a feeling that resembled the bliss of the epileptic. And the revolts that 
followed it were the first attempt of mankind to bring the new body under 
its control. The power of the proletariat is the measure of its convales- 
cence. If it is not gripped to the very marrow by the discipline of this 
power, no pacifist polemics will save it. Living substance conquers the 
frenzy of destruction only in the ecstasy of procreation." {Walter Benjamin} 
-Susan Lord 
Excerpted from "One-Way Street: To the Planetarium," trans. Edmund Jephcott Walter 
Benjamin: Selected Writings Volume 1, 1913-1926. (Cambridge, Mass; London: Belknap 
Press of Haward University Press, 1996), 486-87. 
Poetics 
One is offered, under normal circumstances, many opportunities to write. 
The potential author reads, as best as he can, the intentions of the person 
offering the opportunity and makes, in delivering up his or her piece, a 
counter-offer. If published or presented, the author then watches his piece 
become the object of a peculiar, pre-set kind of literary evaluation. That is, 
he or she, having put the piece up for adoption, then watches the critical 
reception of the piece grow. The likelihood is great that the piece will be 
(1) accepted to extoled or (2) rejected to deplored or (3) ignored (it's all the 
same). All the parties involved will basically get what they deserve. The 
process is rigidly predetermined on the editorial, poetic and consummatory 
levels. Normally, such literary enterprise is ideological, boring, tedious and 
irrelevant. Whatever decisions are made throughout this process are based 
on conservative or experimental (it's all the same) notions of the necessary 
or sufficient conditions for something to be considered literature andlor for 
it to be considered to be in possession of an aestheticlpoetic. 
The notion that people agree or disagree (it's all the same) about the sta- 
tus of something as a piece of literature is appalling. It is not that opinions 
would not vary, but that they should or should not is an idea that has to go. 
I understand the new poetic of literature (the poetics of the new litera- 
ture interests me very little) to be a situation within which something may 
be offered to become whatever it will become, one alternative of which is 
that it may become literature possesed of a poetic. All of this has nothing 
to do with the nature of the thing being offered. 
The new poetic is largely a matter of serendipity. It is the process by 
which an individual assigns a thing to such and such a region of writing. 
It is also the process by which an author recognizes the possibility that an 
individual may assign a piece to such and such a region of writing. It is not 
the beliefs that the reader or author may hold which give reason for think- 
ing something or other possesses a poetic. It is not the qualities in a piece 
against which these beliefs are applied or withdrawn. 
One might say that the new poetic is a kind of "found situation." I 
would like to see a concept of literature that did not require anthologies. 
The new poetic, and the new literature by which it is characterized, re- 
quire an unprecedented openness and lack of pre-committment on the 
parts of the editors, publishers, authors, and, although somewhat less so, 
the readers. 
I would be pleased if this piece could be appropriated as poetry or 
science, religion or philosophy or, for that matter, anything else. That it 
possesses a poetic or that it does not is a specific condition of how it is 
appropriated. What is appropriated, how it is appropriated and by whom 
it is appropriated remain open questions. 
At stake is a work's potential as literature and not it's literary potential. 
Just as the artist has traditionally aetheticized activities such as politics, 
so now virtually anyone who poeticizes writing, who endows it with a 
poetic, will tacitly lend it status as literature. This is not a situation of 
literary freedom, but freedom as a prerequisite to  the condition out of 
which a thing is appropriated as literature and which may or may not bear 
a poetic. 
The approach that I am offering here has been applied as an explana- 
tion, justification or theory for both the avant-garde and the academy, as 
a means of characterizing the conventional or the new, the stereotypical or 
the novel, the clichC and the revelation (it's all the same). This, however, is 
just another case of extending the boundaries of art. Even though new cri- 
teria frequently entail the rejection of the conventional and stereotypical 
(the academic), the choices of what the new criteria constitute proceed 
from the same basis. The freedom here does not so much apply to the con- 
dition out of which a thing is appropriated as literature so much as to the 
licence lent those responsible for literature and the revision of its necessary 
and sufficient conditions. 
The problem so far has been exactly that the concepts of literature and 
the attributes of the poetic have both been fluid. This implies an evolu- 
tionary rather than situational or transactional frame of reference, a kind 
of functional and necessary interrelationship between literature and its 
attributes which can no longer be defended. The new literature and its 
corollary poetic should, as should anything else, take its cues and defini- 
tions from usage. Usage should follow from the author's or reader's recog- 
nition of a situation in which a work can advantageously present itself for 
consideration aesthetically or be appropriated as literature. 
Presented things seek work. They seek an identity. Refusal of a thing is 
wrongheaded if it is refused on principle. Acceptance of a thing implies 
some kind of need but not necessarily the one that motivated the author to 
present the work in the first place. 
Y may offer an ideal situation within which things may present them- 
selves as candidates for becoming a something. X may feel an affinity for 
the qualifications of this situation for presenting a work. The basis for this 
affinity may, in less flexible situations, be entirely absent from the mind of 
the person offering the situation, or even be antagonistic to his intention. 
Z may perceive that the situational circumstances are such as to encour- 
age his appropriation of something as 1, 2,  or 3 and that, from among 
things present, one of them offers less obstacles to one of these goals than 
to others. The actuality of the objects and the situation bear no necessary 
relationships. 
The concept of literature is of a kind with the concept, say, of exercise. 
It is nothing other than what becomes that thing. It cannot work the other 
way around. Literature is nothing if it is not what has become literature. 
The becoming of literature is not, properly speaking, the business of the 
one responsible for what it is that becomes literature. 
There is no new literature-only the concept of literature. There's no 
theory of the new literature-only the concept of literature. There is no 
renewal of literature. Neither the poet nor the reader are in any position to 
identify literature, but only the nature of the process whereby something 
is appropriated as literature. Literature cannot be identified until it has 
become literature. The poetics are the specific and not the generalizable 
course of the becoming. 
The "intermedia" artist or "poly-artist" is a theoretical construct for 
a person who can no longer predict what he is but lacks the courage to 
extend the possibilities beyond the extended family of the arts. Still, it is 
the closest we have come. The question then must be raised: who is respon- 
sible for the new literature-the new poetic? The answer is clearly that no 
one is. 
The poetics of the new literature are not packed with uncertainty, con- 
fusion or even permissiveness. The only confusion is with how and where 
things were offered and how and where things are offered (the things 
themselves matter rather little); how and where things were appropriated 
and how and where things are appropriated. So long as those involved in 
the literary trades have a hand in the conditions under which a thing is 
appropriated as literature, we are condemned to conservatism, radicalism, 
academicism and experimentalism, all upshots of manifestly old concepts 
of literature. The poetics of the new literature amounts to nothing more 
than a piece in its becoming. 





"Political" shares its root with "polisY'-referring to people in a place or a 
society. The "polis" was, ideally, a society in which debate and decisions 
could be achieved since it was a small, intelligent, and flexible society in 
which there were few enough members that regulatory bureaucracies could 
be kept to a minimum if not entirely dispensed with. "Political" is the 
adjective referring to disciplines and practices involving the polis or politic 
-political science, political processes, political animals perhaps? 
"Political" is very frequently deployed as a negative adjective. The word 
now so often connotes irksome bureaucracy and debates that have become 
non-debates since they are in fact irresolvable. "Political" people-whether 
or not they are individuals, committee members or indeed members of 
legislatures, are those people who stall important and inevitable decisions, 
or who truly do make mountains out of molehills. "Political" people and 
institutions are true specialists at thinking globally while being unable to 
act locally. 
The word "political" becomes tricky to define when it is deployed in 
relation to art or artistic practices (or artistic mentalities). Art, and not 
only according to high modernists, is supposed to be somewhere between 
apolitical and beyond political-free of ideological baggage not to men- 
tion state, corporate, or self-censorship. How many of those concerned 
with political or "identity-related" representational issues have not been 
accused of being non or anti-artists because of the accusers' inability to 
grasp that the artworks in question have their own intrinsic formal logics 
that must encompass so-called "bad politics?" Of course, the most negli- 
gible consequence of "political correctness" is political incorrectness for 
its own sake; an aggressive insistence that "political incorrectness is sub- 
versive." For every inspired individual who may well problematize rote 
ideologies either by means of radically-subjective associations or by (sigh) 
virtuosity of execution so stunning that it cannot be simply ignored or 
refused, there are so many hack "artists" who feel threatened by serious 
representational issues and who thus "act out" by pandering to the (not 
necessarily) cheap seats. In such an arena, there are allegedly no politics. 
There is only the question of whether it is beautiful or ugly, funny or 
painfully earnest. 
The actor who becomes a successful politician is of course mirrored by 
the politician who is really an actor. For some time now it has been a real- 
ity that professional politicians are in fact anything but politically-moti- 
vated. The desire to achieve executive power and then maintain it for its 
own sake does not necessarily involve having any sort of political agenda. 
Agendas are often the last complication that the mythical average voter 
or citizen needs to hear about. "Political" is now more often than not 
deployed to refer to what is either not at all actually political or what is an 
unintended parody of political discourse. The word "political," in fact, is 
now frequently a derogatory term for a perception of over-bureaucratiza- 
tion. An individual who causes meetings to drag on interminably because 
she or he always has to ask too many either legitimate or trite questions 
is "political." Nothing ever gets done within or by such organizations be- 
cause decisions can never be made-the organizations actually become the 
antithesis of "political." 
The labeling of individuals or organizations as being "political" -how- 
ever tongue-in-cheek or sarcastic such labeling might intentionally be- 
does reek of a barely-latent modernism that has never quite disappeared 
even through the decades of postmodernism during which "art for art's 
sake" and "art devoid of all possible meanings except for those intrinsic to 
its literal formal realities" have been scorned and ridiculed by so many 
countless academics, cultural theorists and pundits. The reality of grant- 
ing-agencies, curators and selection committees has always rested upon 
concepts of excellence regardless of politics, or perhaps excellence regard- 
less of whether or not the art or artist actually has any politics. When an 
artist or artwork is labeled "political," the labeling is prompted by the fact 
that such art or artist cannot easily be homogenized or airbrushed. The 
political agenda is too apparent, too much a part of the art's or artist's 
intention to be safely formalized. The labeling may be derogatory or com- 
plimentary, but, within selection processes founded upon an apolitical 
notion of "excellence" such a labeling can easily become a means of denial 
or censure. Helshelit is simply too damn political. 
For many global citizens, largely but not at all exclusively young or 
youthful, the words "politics" and "political" have come to refer to pro- 
cesses removed from immediate situations and realities. "Politics" is quasi- 
synonymous with parliamentarism, democracy with all of the signs but 
without any significant decision-making and subsequent actions. The 
people comprising the legislatures are far removed from those who could 
(or did) vote them into power. Members of parliament need to be wealthy 
to even consider standing for election and are hopelessly compromised 
by their contradictory funding sources. Positional adjectives such as "left" 
and "right" have lost historical meanings and relevance. Is this shift in- 
dicative of the fact that Marxism is all but extinct and that social democ- 
racies are obsessed with achieving and then retaining power and are thus 
so obsessed with trying to please everybody that they have in fact aban- 
doned politics? Or is this more an indication of frustration and anger 
at useless bureaucracies of all ideological stripes that merely serve to im- 
pede site-specific decisions that must be made quickly and without delay 
in immediate situations where rational rather than irrational efficiency is 
exactly what the doctor must order. Political individuals are in these situ- 
ations dinosaurs-well-intentioned liberals who only slow everything 
POL-POP 
down in the ultimately irrelevant interest of "fairness" and simulated 
democracy. Ironically, this impatience with big politics and cumbersome 
parliamentary procedures returns political discourse back to the polis 
in which there were many but not far too many voices with the right to 
be heard and in which cacophony and false anarchy could be avoided 
as long as people were willing to listen and concentrate on the problem 
at hand. 
So . .  .is the vacillating hostility and indifference to politics and the 
"political" an indication of a post-political Zeitgeist? And what might be 
meant by "post-political?" That political discourse itself be taken for 
granted and then acted upon? That citizens of the globe might actually be 
up to the daunting task of anarchy -referring not to chaos but to self-gov- 
ernment? Is anarchy even remotely feasible as long as profit motives for 
both individuals and multi-national corporations not only exist but are 
celebrated? Is "post-political" synonymous with "post-historical; mean- 
ing that superficially-unregulated free enterprise has won the war and 
become the governing ideology by pretending not to be an ideology? Is 
"post-political" anarchy by default? Are there any viable alternatives or is 
it simply fatigue and exasperation camouflaged by bravura? Are "post- 
political" and "apolitical" synonymous? I hope not, but I often suspect so. 
-Andrew James Paterson 
Popoloid 
ponder a popoloid segment 
shape shifter propels zings through space whistling alien 
whooooistles hoooo oooo oooo 
where's my brain 
I left in Spain or maybe it slipped down the drain 
I left it in haloes above my head 
a poisonous flower 
pulls stretches taut twists curves bend snakelike wraps around compresses 
tight 
whisper blow breathe through it hollow 
from one ear to the other 
listen 
pompous and portly worn on head or haloed a crown 
around a waist a throat atop a head encircling a wrist ankle a charm 
positively possesses portent powers and possibilities to posture as 
propellors through 
space whooooooistling dixie bird sounds under water 
whooo oooo ooo are you whooo oooo ooo am I 
powerless motionless pirches mystically gnarled coiled squat tight 
pops crinkles stands upright scales low to high 
joins itself or others 
the quicker the velocity the higher the frequency to peak 
the slower the lower wavers tones at varying drones 
hollow hose hosery rosery accordioned 
bellows airing a vacuum on high 
pour your worries into me 
I am a hollow 
for you to fill 
I'll bend like a willow (a tube) to please 
but will you follow when I need? 





"It is with respect to this multiple significance of the public realm that the 
term 'private,' in its original private sense, has meaning. To live an entirely 
private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to a truly 
human life: to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and 
heard by others, to be deprived of an 'objective' relationship with them 
that comes from being related to and separated from them through the 
intermediary of a common world of things, to be deprived of the poss- 
ibility of achieving something more permanent than life itself. The priva- 
tion of privacy lies in the absence of others; as far as they are concerned, 
private man does not appear, and therefore it is as though he did not exist. 
Whatever he does remains without significance and consequence to others, 
and what matters to him is without interest to other people. 
Under modern circumstances, this deprivation of 'objective' relation- 
ships to others and of a reality guaranteed through them has become the 
mass phenomenon of loneliness, where it has assumed its most extreme and 
most antihuman form. The reason for this extremity is that mass society 
not only destroys the public realm but the private as well, deprives men 
not only of their place in the world but of their private home, where they 
once felt sheltered against the world, and where, at any rate, even those 
excluded from the world could find a substitute in the warmth of the hearth 
and the limited reality of family life." {Hannah Arendt} 
-Susan Lord 
Excerpted from "The Private Realm: Property," The Human Condition (Chicago: Univer 
sity of Chicago Press, 1958), 58-59. 
Progress 
"I used to be at  the top of my profession; the well-dressed middle-aged 
man declares, "but then things changed, technology changed and I couldn't 
keep up. So I went to DeVry Institute and got the skills I need to succeed 
in today's world. CHANGE IS GOOD!" the advertisement concludes. 
"Change is good! " 
The most important thing that happened in the last millennium is that 
the entire world became convinced that change is good. To have believed 
and openly expressed this idea at  the beginning of the millennium would 
have gotten you burned at the stake or worse. To believe the contrary at  
the end of the millennium will doom you to a similar fate. The belief that 
change is good is the core of a belief in progress. In and of itself the state- 
ment "change is good" is of course absurd. To determine if a particular 
change is good or bad requires a standard by which to judge a particular 
change. Defenders of the idea of progress would argue that technological 
change which brings economic benefits is what is meant. But from the 
introduction of the first machine in the textile industry in England, tech- 
nological change has brought economic benefits to a few and social and 
environmental changes to everyone. Technological change is not just tech- 
nological change, it sets in motion a chain reaction of social, political and 
environmental changes. The economic benefits of a technological change 
can readily be counted, but the social and environmental costs cannot. 
Whether a change is good or bad is impossible to determine. Thus the 
belief in progress is ultimately based on faith. 
The belief that change is bad, to put it crudely, was the central glue that 
held societies together at the beginning of the millennium. It took many 
forms in many parts of the world, some benign others brutal. North Amer- 
ican natives who saw themselves as a part of a web of life that they could 
not change without retribution; Catholics believed that God created the 
world, including its social order, as he wanted it and any change was 
therefore against his will; the caste system in Hindu India.. .all of these 
had this orientation to change in common. 
The belief that change is good has equally become the central glue, the 
myth of modern societies around the world. How else could the entire 
world link itself to an economic system that by definition cannot stand 
still, and which demands that people, communities, societies, nations and 
the earth itself yield to its dictates, even if it results in their dissolution or 
destruction. The system wipes out the livelihoods of millions every time it 
incorporates a new technology into its systems of production, distribution 
and consumption. The myth of progress is as important to capitalist soci- 
eties as the myth of the divine right of kings was to feudal Europe. 
This orientation toward change has had perverse effects in all sorts of 
areas. If change is good today it must have been good in the past as well, 
and if this is the case then all of human history must logically be one pro- 
gression from bad to better. Indeed even a cursory look at our past surely 
proves this to be true. Were humans not originally mere animals, ignorant, 
homeless, unclothed, subject to the forces of nature? Are we not much 
better off today? Has science not answered most of our questions and 
technology given us the means to put a man on the moon? It has proved 
possible to find evidence of this progression everywhere one looks. Even 
in the arts one can discover a progression from "primitive art" through 
the ages to the perfection of techniques leading to ever "higher artistic 
achievements." In music too there appears to be a sort of progression from 
the music created by "primitive" societies to  those of more and more 
"advanced" societies leading to the present. And who could deny that 
science has progressed over the centuries. Change has even taken on 
fetishistic qualities in the realm of fashion and pop music not to mention 
computer technology, where only the "latest" is of any use at all. 
Humanity has been affected by this reorientation on many subtle levels. 
If change is good then the work required to produce it must also be of high 
value. So the project of convincing the world that change is good also 
entailed convincing the world that work is good, that work is the road to 
salvation. This went against the grain of most of humanity, which always 
considered work to be a necessary evil. When change was still bad, any- 
thing that produced change like science, technology and excessive work 
was also suspect. Some philosophers went so far as to argue that the things 
humans did as a means toward an end, such as work, were no different 
than what animals did to survive. What differentiates us from animals is 
what we do as ends in themselves. 
If change has been so good to us then is it not also our duty to help 
those "less advanced" by encouraging change elsewhere, is it not even our 
duty to do so even if those "less advanced" peoples are too ignorant to 
recognize the wisdom of change? It was of course a considerable part of 
the "white man's burden" to rid the other peoples of the world of their 
laziness and sloth. Through hard work humanity could change the world 
to suit its purposes, to build a utopia in which hunger, disease and even 
inequality could all be eliminated. Once at that point even the need for 
work and further change could be a thing of the past. 
Cracks in the foundation of this "Myth of Progress" appear to be visi- 
ble even now. As the means of producing change have become more and 
more potent, the utopia they were intended to construct has proved to be 
the Fata Morgana at the door of death. But change is not reversible and all 
of our intellectual tools, even our languages are useless in charting a path 
forward. Once self-sufficient communities have been torn apart by market 
forces and new technologies, putting them back together is like unscram- 





Merleau-Ponty (1945) claimed that a theory of the body is, ipso facto, 
already a theory of perception, and he was, in my opinion, absolutely right 
in a depth-psychological sense which no psychoanalytic metapsychology 
has yet been able to account for. It is easy to be distracted from the extra- 
ordinary sensuality of the psychic process, to forget its vividness in order 
to make some point about pain, need, desire, the phallus, power, conflict, 
morality, and the like. All of the arguments which Freud, Klein, Lacan, 
and others make about the facts of psychic life, sexuality, language, and 
dependence have been illustrated abundantly in the technical literature. 
But rarely does one find any explicit appreciation of the sheer wonderment 
of psychosomatic functioning, the utter funktionslust of ordinary being. 
In this respect, psychoanalysts are just as uncomprehending as linguistic 
philosophers and cultural theorists: they can talk forever about the intri- 
cate and seductive structures of signification, the ways in which this body 
part or that signifier slides into another, corresponds to another, substi- 
tutes for another, refers to another-and they can go on about history and 
society until everyone is blue in the face-without really encountering the 
blunt substance of meaning, the crude semantic fact of the body, which 
has no structure in itself, no status within any system of signification: it 
just means.l 
People reveal the internal world in various ways, but its internality is 
never so clearly evident as it is in the psychoanalytic setting. [Allon] White 
has argued that the psycho-pathological phenomena associated with hys- 
teria in Charcot's day-Freud's 'discovery of the unconscious'-may be 
explained as a kind of return of the social repressed. According to White, 
the sensuous body of pre-modern societies has been fragmented, mar- 
ginalized, and neurotically sublimated in contemporary civilization. He 
describes a suppressive transformation of "material, physical practice into 
purely textual semeosis,"* in which a robust communal expression of the 
body politic has degenerated into a morbid private fantasy. This insight is 
pushed into an argument against psychoanalysis, in favour of "a thor- 
oughly historicized, social understanding of mechanisms that Freud mis- 
takenly thought to be more or less universal."3 Yet, as Burgin has pointed 
out, "Psychoanalysis does not construct a realm of the 'subjective' apart 
from social life." If the internal world is "more or less universal" {sic}, 
this is true in the same sense that 'society' is universal: it is an irreducible 
dimension of human experience, not to be mistaken for an historical con- 
struct such as juridical individ~alism.~ But one does not have to believe 
that the internal world is an ephemeral effect of the historical process 
to  appreciate White's central point-that the dynamic experience of the 
social body has been reintrojected and repressed in industrial civilizations. 
The situation that we are facing is not so much that the breakdown of 
communal life has forced the symbolic universe into a psychic under- 
ground (as if unconscious fantasy were a purely modern invention); what 
has become private, fragmented, and precarious is not the activity of the 
internal world (which, if anything, is more public than ever), but the forms 
and means of its ritual expression in social relationships. We can see now 
that the therapeutic function in contemporary urban societies is a distilla- 
tion from traditional social dramaturgy;S it is bottled and sold in the form 
of technical professional healing relationships. 
Notes 
1 But in the best technical formulations, the aesthetic phenomena which presumably corre- 
spond in some way to the concepts of pleasure, experience, and drive remain latent and 
thus become accessible to reflective observation. 
2 Allon White, "Hysteria and the end of carnival: Festivity and bourgeois neurosis," Semi- 
otica 54, 1-2 (1985), 109. 
3 ibid, 85-86. 
4 Charles Levin, "Art and the Sociological Ego: Value from a Psychoanalytic Point of 
View," Life After Postmodernism: Essays on Value and Culture, ed. John Fekete (New 
York: St. Martin's, 1987), 22-63. 
5 Stanley Diamond, In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilization (New Brunswick, 
N. J: Transaction Books, 1974). 
-Charles Levin 
Excerpted from "Metapsychology of the Infant Body: Psycho-analytic Aesthetics Recons~d- 
ered," Publzc 3: Carnal Knowledge, 1990. 
Quiet Revolution 
It is within the common sense of public life in Quebec to frame the Quiet 
Revolution as a cultural revolution leading to the interlaced development 
of new formations of sociality: secularization and educational reform; 
democratization and reconstruction of the state apparatus; the formation 
of a "national" business class. In other words, both erudite knowledges 
and popular memory frame the Quiet Revolution as both a process of 
modernization and the emergence of Quebec into m0dernity.l The cultural 
character of this interlaced development is most often viewed as a struc- 
turing shift in and between institutions, practices and mentalitbs. Thanks 
to this shift, the ratio between private and public action as well as between 
the "people" and the public institutions of state and economy are under- 
stood as having been transformed. 
At the same time, less attention has been paid to the concomitant elab- 
oration of a complex field of governmental action centred on the domains 
of culture: "elite" culture and the arts, popular culture and the cultural 
- - 
industries, heritage and museums, the cultural geography of the regions, 
language policy, immigration and the "cultural" communities. In addition, 
while the successive ministries of culture have acted as a central agency in 
this action, its interventions have extended into the actions of the majority 
of ministries. The most recent Cultural Policy, for example, lists fourteen 
ministries directly involved in intervention in the cultural field. Just as 
important are the relations between these domains of state action and the 
elaboration, inside and outside of the state, of a public discourse of QuCbC- 
cois identity subtending the more general claims to sovereign action of the 
